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High-Frequency Trading and the New Stock Market:
Sense And Nonsense
by Merritt B. Fox, Columbia Law School, Lawrence R. Glosten, Columbia Business School, and
Gabriel V. Rauterberg, Michigan Law School*

tock trading in the U.S. has been totally transformed over the last twenty-five years. The
NASDAQ dealers and NYSE specialists are gone;
the same stock can now be traded on up to 60
competing venues where computers match incoming orders.
But not everyone is pleased with the results.
The new stock market features several controversial participants and practices. High-frequency traders (“HFTs”), which
participate in a significant portion of all trades, are criticized
as taking advantage of other traders by rapidly adjusting their
own orders in response to transactions in a practice known
as “electronic front-running.” Also under suspicion are “dark
pools,” which are off-exchange trading venues that promise to
keep orders secret and can limit trading to certain kinds of
traders.1 And perhaps most visibly, HFTs have been blamed
for events like the infamous “Flash Crash” of May 6, 2010, a
period of less than 30 minutes during which the Dow Jones
Industrial Average dropped about 1,000 points (representing
9% of its value) and then recovered almost its entire loss. Polls
indicate that “roughly two-thirds of Americans believe the stock
market unfairly benefits some at the expense of others,” a belief
that some commentators use to explain a sharp drop in the
percentage of Americans directly or indirectly owning equities.2
Critics have been vocal. Charlie Munger, vice chairman
of Berkshire Hathaway, argued that high-frequency trading
is “legalized front-running . . . [that] should never have been
able to reach the size that it did.”3 And New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman has complained that “[w]
hen blinding speed is coupled with early access to data, it
gives small groups of traders the power to manipulate market
movements in their own favor before anyone else knows
what’s happening.”4 But the most critical and well-publicized
attack on the new stock market appeared in Michael Lewis’
best-selling book, Flash Boys: A Wall Street Revolt. Lewis
famously claimed that “[t]he United States stock market, the
most iconic market in global capitalism, is rigged.”5

Regulators reacted rapidly to the furor over the new
stock market ignited by Lewis’ book. Soon after, the U.S.
Department of Justice, the FBI, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”), and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission all confirmed investigations into HFTs. The
New York Attorney General brought a high-profile lawsuit
against the major investment bank Barclays, alleging that
it misrepresented the extent to which its dark pool was free
of HFT activity.6 And several Congressional hearings were
held, after which U.S. Senator Carl Levin wrote to Mary Jo
White, the Chair of the SEC, demanding significant changes
to market structure and the elimination of “[c]onflicts of
interest [that] erode public confidence in the markets.”7
In this condensed summary of our earlier work, we argue
that the issues are more complicated. And because the performance of the U.S. equity market has important effects on not
only the investment returns of ordinary individuals, but the
overall efficiency and real rate of growth of the U.S. economy,
much is at stake in how such issues get resolved and what
policy interventions are targeted at them.
We will argue that effective resolution of these controversies must begin with a comprehensive framework for
understanding the new stock market. While legal scholars have applied the insights of many economic theories to
law, they have largely not done so with the field of market
microstructure. This article uses the insights of microstructure economics to provide a framework that relies on two
basic mechanisms—adverse selection and the principal-agent
problem—to analyze these controversial trading practices
as they operate within a multi-venue system. We apply this
framework to five of the new market’s most controversial
practices and evaluate the effects in terms of the ultimate
social functions served by the equity markets.
We conclude that some proposed reforms appear
unambiguously desirable, such as those requiring brokers
to improve their disclosures regarding their execution of

*This is a condensed version of The New Stock Market: Sense and Nonsense, 65
DUKE LAW JOURNAL 191 (2015).
1. Sam Mamudi, UBS Hit With Record Dark Pool Fine for Breaking U.S. Rules,
Bloomberg, Jan. 15, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2015-01-15/sec-finesubs-dark-pool-more-than-14-million-for-breaking-rules.html.
2. See Lydia Saad, U.S. Stock Ownership Stays at Record Low, Gallup Economy, May
8, 2013, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/162353/stock-ownership-stays-record-low.aspx.

3. Sam Mamudi, Charlie Munger: HFT is Legalized Front-Running, Barron’s, May 3,
2013, http://blogs.barrons.com/stockstowatchtoday/2013/05/03/charlie-munger-hft-islegalized-front-running/.
4. Linette Lopez, New York’s Attorney General Has Declared War On Cheating HighFrequency Traders, Bus. Insider, Sep. 24, 2013, http://www.businessinsider.com/
schneiderman-targets-hft-front-running-2013-9.
5. Michael Lewis, Flash Boys: A Wall Street Revolt (2014).
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customer orders, including those directed to dark pools. But
other proposed reforms involve tradeoffs between different
social goals, where the most socially desirable outcome is
far from clear. In such cases, a better understanding of the
tradeoffs involved should make for more informed regulatory choices, while also pointing to where further empirical
research would be useful. We find this to be the case with
proposals, for example, to briefly delay providing HFTs with
information about new transactions and quotation changes,
and so reduce HFTs’ informational advantages over other
traders. Finally, still other proposed reforms are bad ideas that
seem to be based on a misunderstanding of how the market
really works or of the actual impact of a given practice. We
find this to be the case for proposals that would require HFTs
to keep their quotes in force for some minimum amount of
time, as well as for proposals aimed at generally discouraging,
or even banning, trading on dark pools.
How the Stock Market Has Changed
As recently as the early 1990s, publicly traded stocks were still
largely confined to trading on a single venue, which was either
NASDAQ or the New York Stock Exchange. For anyone
wanting to buy or sell a stock listed on NASDAQ, a member
dealer was the purchaser of every share sold and the seller of
every share bought. Dealers provided prices based on their
own calculations and judgments as individual human beings.
At the NYSE, stock “specialists” played a similar dealer role,
but also posted quotes sent in by traders willing to buy or sell
at stated prices, held auctions, and helped arrange trades by
brokers and traders on the NYSE floor.
Today, the NASDAQ dealers and NYSE specialists are
gone. Any given stock can be traded on one of almost 60
competing venues, twelve exchanges, and around 30 active
dark pools.8 Most of these competing trading venues, and
all of the exchanges, are electronic limit order books, where a
trader can post as a limit order its firm commitment to buy
or sell up to a specified number of shares at a quoted price. A
computer (the venue’s matching engine) matches these posted
limit orders with incoming buy and sell market orders, which
are orders from traders willing to trade at whatever is the best
available price in the market.9
6. Complaint, Schneiderman v. Barclays, No. 451391/2014 (N.Y. Sup. 2014).
7. See Letter, July 9, 2014, http://levin.senate.gov/download/levin_letter_
sec_070914.
8. Laura Tuttle, Alternative Trading Systems: Description of ATS Trading in National
Market System Stocks, Division of Economic and Risk Analysis 5-6, http://www.sec.gov/
marketstructure/research/ats_data_paper-_october_2013.pdf.
9. The computer will also match the limit orders posted on the venue with “marketable limit orders.” A buy limit order is “marketable” when it has a limit price greater than
or equal to the lowest offer in the market, and a sell limit order is “marketable” when it
has a limit price less than or equal to the highest bid.
10. See Jonathan A. Brogaard, High Frequency Trading and its Impact on Market
Quality, Working Paper (2010), which finds using the NASDAQ data set that HFTs supply liquidity for 51% of all trades and provide the market quotes 50% of the time. See
generally Albert J. Menkveld, High-Frequency Trading and the New-Market Makers, 16
J. Fin. Markets 712 (2013).
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Today, HFTs post a significant portion of the limit orders
that result in executed trades.10 An HFT uses high-speed
communications and data about activity at venues to constantly
update its information about executed trades in each stock that
it regularly trades, as well as changes in the buy and sell limit
orders posted by others on every trading venue. Computers
use this information and proprietary algorithms to change the
HFT’s own limit orders posted on each of the various trading
venues. More than three-quarters of all trades in the United
States are executed on one or another of these venues.11 Most
of the remaining trades involve a broker that internally matches
the buy and sell orders received from its own retail customers
or through over-the-counter market-making.
Forces for Change and the Role of Regulation
The new stock market is partly the product of the information technology revolution, but also partly the result of
Congressional and SEC choices. The initial impetus for this
new market structure was Congress’s adoption in 1975 of the
National Market System (“NMS”) amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”).
Multiple, competing trading venues have the advantage
of greater efficiency and stronger incentives for innovation.
At the same, they have the disadvantage that orders are
fragmented among multiple venues, complicating the matching of buyers and sellers. Improving information technology
allows traders to manage this complexity by showing what is
going on in each of these venues.
Congress’ NMS amendments pushed the system to
develop in this direction, and this development has been
consistently supported by the SEC.12 And the dramatically
increased speed and lower cost of trading that have been
documented since then suggest that the new stock market is
a substantial improvement over what came before it.13 Though
academic theorists continue to debate whether even greater
improvements would have arisen if today’s technology were
operating within a centralized single venue system, this is
entirely a matter of speculation. Moreover, as a matter of
political reality, any attempt to centralize the multiple venues
would meet stiff resistance from those who have configured
their businesses for a multi-venue structure. Thus, we believe
11. Laura Tuttle, OTC Trading: Description of Non-ATS OTC Trading in National Market
System Stocks, Division of Economic and Risk Analysis, https://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/research/otc-_trading_march_2014.pdf.
12. Congress, when the NMS amendments were adopted, expected that there would
be a proliferation of competing venues. It self-consciously rejected a proposal for an
electronic limit order book where all order flow was directed to a single trading venue,
known as a central limit order book (“CLOB”). See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 75, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., 12 (1975), 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 190 (“Senate Report”) (rejecting role for
“the SEC . . . as an ‘economic czar’ for the development of a national market system”
and noting that “a fundamental premise of the bill is that . . . a national market system
. . . will depend upon the vigor of competition within the securities industry”).
13. See James J. Angel, Lawrence E. Harris & Chester S. Spatt, Equity Trading in the
21st Century: An Update 11-12 (2013), which reports significant increases in the
speed of execution, decreases in the bid-ask spread, decreases in commissions, and increases in the number of quotes per minute.
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the policy favoring multiple venues is unlikely to be reversed
in the future, and any reforms enacted will take place within
the current multiple venue system.
The NMS amendments also included broad provisions for
consolidating information in the U.S. stock market. The SEC
requires trading venues to have systems (called SIPs); there
is one for NASDAQ listed stock and one for securities listed
either on the NYSE or elsewhere, which provide the best bid
and best offer quotes for each stock traded. The SIPs aggregate
this information into consolidated books with the best offer
and best bid for a stock at each of the venues where it trades,
along with the corresponding sizes, and they make this quote
information available to the public on fair and reasonable
terms. At any given time, the best bid and best offer on this
consolidated book represents the official National Best Bid
(NBB) and National Best Offer (NBO), which together make
up the NBBO.
But because the national reporting system’s updates lag
slightly behind any change in the best bid or offer available, HFTs can use their co-location, private data feeds,
and superior information technology infrastructure to carry
out their practices of electronic front running, slow market
arbitrage, and dark pool mid-point order exploitation. During
the lags, they can cancel standing limit orders and post new
ones—which means that the quotes in the consolidated book
may no longer in fact be available.
Five of the Most Controversial New Practices
In the rest of this article, we focus mainly on five new stock
market practices that have attracted particular controversy. The
first three practices are made possible by the HFTs’ “co-location” of computers right next to each exchange’s matching
engine, which allows the HFTs to learn about trades and
adjust their limit bids and offers sooner than some other traders. (It must be stressed, though, that many traders other than
HFTs also co-locate, acquire high-speed communications, and
use private data feeds.) HFTs can cancel old limit orders and
submit new ones very quickly. The HFT’s co-location facility at each exchange is connected to all its other co-location
facilities through specialized fiber optic cables that have their
matching engines in northern New Jersey.
1. HFT electronic front running. Let’s examine the practice
of electronic front running through a simple example involving just one HFT, called Lightning, and two exchanges,
BATS Y and the NYSE. Lightning has co-location facilities
at the locations of the BATS Y and NYSE matching engines.
These co-location facilities are connected with each other
by high-speed communications equipment.14 An actively
14. See supra Subsections I.A and I.C for a discussion of exchange matching engines
and HFT co-location facilities.
15. This example fleshes out the story by Michael Lewis of how electronic front running could occur with Amgen stock in such a situation. Lewis, Flash Boys, at 33-34.
Lewis asserts that the HFT could profit at the expense of others by cancelling its quotes
on another exchange, but he does not discuss exactly why it would be profitable for the
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managed institutional investor, Smartmoney, decides that
Amgen’s future cash flows are going to be greater than its
current price suggests. The NBO is $48.00, with 10,000
shares being offered at this price on BATS Y and 35,000
shares at this price on NYSE. Smartmoney decides to buy a
substantial block of Amgen stock and sends a 10,000 share
market buy order to BATS Y and a 35,000 share market
buy order to NYSE.15 The 35,000 shares offered at $48.00
on NYSE are all from sell limit orders posted by Lightning.
The order sent to BATS Y arrives at its destination first
and executes. Lightning’s co-location facility there learns
of the transaction very quickly. An algorithm infers from
this information that an informed trader might be looking
to buy a large number of Amgen shares and thus may have
sent buy orders to other exchanges as well. Because of Lightning’s ultra-high speed connection, it has the ability to send a
message from its BATS Y co-location facility to its co-location
facility at NYSE, which in turn has the ability to cancel
Lightning’s 35,000 share $48.00 limit sell order posted on
NYSE. All this can happen so fast that the cancellation would
occur before the arrival there of Smartmoney’s market buy
order. If Lightning does cancel in this fashion, it has engaged
in “electronic front running.”
Critics of the practice assert that this allows HFTs to
benefit at the expense of institutional investors.
2. HFT slow market arbitrage. Suppose that the HFT
Lightning has a limit sell order for 1,000 shares of IBM at
$161.15 posted on NYSE. This quote represents the NBO at
the moment. Institutional investor Mr. Lowprice then posts
a new 1,000 share sell limit order for IBM on EDGE for
$161.13. The national reporting system is a bit slow, and so
a short period of time elapses before it reports Lowprice’s
new, better offer. Lightning’s co-location facility at EDGE
very quickly learns of the new $161.13 offer, however, and
an algorithm sends an ultra-fast message to Lightning’s
co-location facility at NYSE informing it of the new offer.
During the reporting gap, though, Lightning keeps posted
its $161.15 offer. Next, Ms. Stumble sends a marketable buy
order to NYSE for 1,000 IBM shares. Lightning’s $161.15
offer remains the official NBO, and so Stumble’s order could
legally transact against it. Lightning’s co-location facility at
NYSE then sends an ultra-fast message to the one at EDGE
instructing it to submit a 1,000 share marketable buy order
there. This buy order transacts against Lowprice’s $161.13
offer. Thus, within the short period before the new $161.13
offer is publicly reported, Lightning has been able to sell
1,000 IBM shares at $161.15 and purchase them at $161.13,
for what appears to be a riskless $20 profit.
HFT to do so. Nor does he analyze how the quotes initially available might be different if
the practice of electronic front running were eliminated. The discussion that follows fills
in these holes.
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3. HFT exploitation of mid-point orders sitting in dark
pools. On yet another day, suppose that an institutional trader
posts a mid-point limit buy order in a dark pool that, until
cancelled, would execute against any market sell order that
subsequently arrived at the dark pool and at a price equal to
the mid-point between the best offer and best bid reported
by the national reporting system on any of the exchanges.
Through its speedy co-location facilities, the HFT Lightning
would observe that the new best offer on that exchange is
lower than the mid-point between what, until that moment,
had been the best bid and best offer available on any public
exchange. Because of the national reporting system’s brief
lag, Lightning could buy shares at the new better price and
then immediately send a sell order to the dark pool, which
executes against the trader’s order at the mid-point between
the still official, but now stale, best offer and best bid reported
by the national system. Since the price paid for the shares by
Lightning on the exchange is lower than the price at which
they are sold to the trader in the dark pool, Lightning makes
another guaranteed profit at the expense of the other traders
in the market.
4. Concerted selling by HFTs during market downturns,
leading to increased volatility and crashes. There was an upsurge
in the volatility of share prices and a few brief crashes and
breakdowns in trading as the new stock market was emerging. Such volatility and crashes have been attributed to the
sudden exit of HFTs from the market after receiving new
market information.
5. Large investment banks in their role as brokers steering orders to their own dark pools. A large investment bank
steers an institutional customer’s buy limit order to its own
dark pool in a way that is unobservable by other traders. The
bank’s proprietary traders learn through an internal source of
the institution’s buy order, giving them the option to fill the
institution’s limit order even when that would be disadvantageous for the customer.
Undertaking a Serious Analysis
Most of the criticism of the new stock market simply shows
that in retrospect a given transaction benefited one party at
the expense of another, finds an advantage that favors the
former, and labels the resulting transfer as “larcenous,” “predatory,” or simply “unfair.” Serious analysis requires digging
deeper, especially since these practices occur repeatedly
between competing actors who generally understand what
is happening and take into account the reaction of the other
market participants. We offer an informal equilibrium analysis of these practices.
While each of the controversial practices seems fairly
distinct, they can all be understood by reference to two basic
dynamics at work in today’s market structure:
Adverse selection. Limit orders substantially increase
liquidity. Those who provide the orders are referred to as
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance • Volume 29 Number 4

“liquidity suppliers” or “market makers.” A professional
supplier of liquidity—in this case, let’s assume it’s an HFT—
buys and sells shares frequently, and it makes money if on
average it sells the shares it buys for more than the price
it paid. As discussed below, a major problem HFTs face is
adverse selection: the possibility that another trader has private
information about a stock’s value that is not known to most
of the market or to the liquidity supplier. When dealing with
such traders, liquidity suppliers will on average lose money
because the better informed will sell to the HFT only when
it is willing to pay too much and buy from the HFT only
when it is willing to sell for too little. To survive, liquidity suppliers must set bids and offers aggressively enough to
attract business, but not so aggressively that they lose more
money trading with informed traders than they make from
uninformed traders. To minimize their losses from adverse
selection, liquidity providers try to identify orders that are
coming from informed traders. At the same time, informed
traders try to prevent their orders from being so identified in
order to buy or sell shares at the best possible prices.
Principal-agent problems. Most traders, even institutional
ones, need brokers, and brokers often exercise substantial
discretion when handling customer orders. Principal-agent
problems arise from conflicts of interest between the broker
(the agent) and the investor (the principal) because the investor usually cannot perfectly observe the broker’s effort and
skill.
Multiple venues. Finally, it’s important to recognize that
although managing adverse selection and principal-agent
problems were challenging under the old single-venue market
system, such challenges have been greatly increased by the
existence of many competing venues for stock trading, which
have made possible all of the controversial practices listed
above.
In sum, the adverse-selection-driven cat and mouse game
between liquidity suppliers and informed traders occurs
within multiple trading venues and in the context of rapid
information technology advances that have created extraordinary complexity as well as new scope for principal-agency
problems between brokers and traders. By understanding how
these three factors interact in a competitive environment, you
can understand most of what is happening.
The Economics of Liquidity Provision
It might appear that a professional liquidity supplier such as
an HFT could make money easily, even in markets with a one
cent spread. For example, simply buying at the bid and selling
at the offer to make a half cent per share on every transaction
for a billion shares should yield a tidy—and apparently riskless—profit of $50 million. In fact, it is not so easy.
Liquidity suppliers generally do not know whom they
are trading with. There is always the possibility that the
trader who places a marketable order that executes against
Fall 2017
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the liquidity supplier’s quote is doing so because the trader
has nonpublic information regarding the value of the stock
that is not known to the liquidity supplier.16 Despite this
informational disadvantage, the liquidity supplier can still
make money on a net basis if it makes enough profit from the
remaining traders who do not possess private information.
We identify three primary kinds of private information,
which we label “inside information,” “announcement information,” and “fundamental value information.”
1. Inside information. Inside information originates
from some institutional source, such as the company issuing
the stock itself. The institution usually seeks to prevent this
information from becoming public, however, and trading
on such information is, under many circumstances, illegal
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act.
Successful prosecutions under these provisions show that such
information is behind at least some of the trading that occurs.
2. Announcement information. This is information that
is disclosed publicly, such as a government statistic about the
economy or a company earnings announcement. Traders who
act on such information very quickly, before other traders
and liquidity suppliers themselves can react and adjust
their quotes, can earn trading profits. We refer to these as
announcement informed traders.
3. Fundamental value information. Some investors use
fundamental value information to produce more accurate
estimates of an issuer’s future cash flows based on sophisticated analysis of publicly available information. Traders
with this kind of information include hedge funds, actively
managed mutual and pension funds, non-profit institutions,
and very wealthy individuals with actively managed portfolios. Liquidity suppliers can also be vulnerable to fundamental
valuation traders because they specialize in supplying liquidity but do not do fundamental analysis themselves.
Adverse Selection
Liquidity providers, as already noted, lose money when trading with informed sellers or buyers. But the liquidity provider
can still break even if the bid and offer spread is large enough
that losses from informed traders are offset by the profits from
trading with uninformed investors.
There are two ways to think about the calculations that
liquidity providers need to survive in a competitive market.
The first, sometimes referred to as the “accounting perspective,” subtracts a liquidity supplier’s losses from transacting
with the informed traders from its gains from transacting
with uninformed traders to determine the spread. The second,
16. See Lawrence E. Harris, Trading and Exchanges 158 (2002), which summarizes
a body of theory and evidence suggesting that in most markets adverse selection accounts for the majority of the bid-ask spread.
17. See Lawrence R. Glosten and Paul R. Milgrom, “Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices
in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders,” 14 J. Fin. Econ. 1,
(1985).
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sometimes referred to as the “information perspective,”
focuses on how liquidity suppliers update their estimates of
a stock’s value in anticipation of whether the next order to
transact against its quotes is a buy or a sell. Because a liquidity supplier knows that the next marketable order may come
from an informed trader, that order will alter the liquidity
supplier’s estimate of the stock’s value—and the adjustment
will be up if it is a buy order and down if it is a sell order.17
Moreover, as liquidity suppliers constantly update their
valuations in response to the inflow of buy and sell orders,
the market comes to reflect private information. If the news
possessed by the informed traders is on balance favorable,
there will be more buys than sells, and the bid and offer
quotes will trend upward. But if the news known by the
informed traders is bad, the mid-point between the bid and
ask will trend downward.18
The Evaluative Framework
HFTs and investment banks trade in a competitive market on
a repeated basis, and the other actors in the system generally
take this fact into account in their own actions. The question
for policymakers and regulators, then, is how their practices
affect the multiple social goals that equity trading markets
are expected to serve.
The most important social goals of secondary equity
markets are generally thought of as including: (1) promoting the efficient allocation of capital so that it goes to the
most promising new investment projects in our economy; (2)
promoting the efficient operation of the economy’s existing
productive capacity; (3) promoting the efficient allocation of
resources between current and future periods; (4) allocating
capital and risk among risk-averse investors in ways consistent
with their capabilities and resources; (5) fostering an overall
sense of fairness among market participants; and accomplishing all these objectives while (6) economizing on the real
resources used in trading markets, including enforcement
and compliance costs, and (7) encouraging valuable innovation in the system.
Two central characteristics of a stock market affect its
ability to deliver on these social goals and serve as proxies
for their success in so doing—namely, share price accuracy
and liquidity.
1. Price accuracy. An accurate share price does a reasonably good job of predicting the issuer’s future cash flows.
Because the price of any new share offering will be determined largely by the price of its already outstanding shares,
more accurate stock market prices will encourage capital
18. See Lawrence R. Glosten and Lawrence E. Harris, “Estimating the Components
of the Bid-Ask Spread,” 21 J. Fin. Econ. 123 (1988), which estimates a model in which
the bid-ask spread is divided into an adverse selection component and a transitory component due to inventory costs, clearing costs, and other factors. .
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to flow to the issuers with the most promising investment
projects. Share prices also influence the availability of new
project funding from other outside sources and the willingness of managers to use internal funds for investment, creating
another link between share price accuracy and the efficient
allocation of capital. And, finally, more accurate share prices
also tend to create a greater sense of fairness among investors
to the extent that they experience fewer very large negative
surprises.19
2. Liquidity. Liquidity is a multi-dimensional concept
that relates to the size of a trade, the price at which it is
accomplished, and the time it takes to complete the trade.
Generally, the larger the size of the purchase or sale and the
faster one wishes to accomplish it, the less desirable will be
the price. But the more liquid the market, the less severe are
these tradeoffs.
For a small retail purchase or sale of stock, the spread
between the national best offer (NBO) and the national
best bid (NBB) is a good measure of liquidity because the
trader can buy or sell immediately at those prices and, in
essence, will be paying half the spread to do so. For larger
orders, the quantity of stock that is available at prices that
are not too far above the NBO or too far below the NBB
(both indicators of the “depth of the book”) will become
relevant as well.
Liquidity also has an impact on a number of social goals:
a. More efficient allocation of resources over time. The
more liquid an issuer’s shares, all other things equal,
the more valuable they are. In this sense, greater
liquidity can be seen as reducing the issuer’s cost of
capital, thereby encouraging it to take on more investment.20
b. Greater share price accuracy. To the extent more
liquidity also lowers the transaction costs associated
with trading based on fundamental, value-based
investment strategies—that is, acquiring and analyzing publicly available information to make more
accurate predictions of an issuer’s cash flows and
earnings—an increase in liquidity can also lead to
more accurate share prices.
c. More efficient allocation of risk. Constant change
means that the optimal portfolio, in terms of diversification and of each investor’s relative degree of risk
aversion, is always shifting. Greater liquidity increases
individual investors’ ability to make cost-effective
adjustments of their portfolios over time.

Analyzing the Five Most Controversial New Stock
Market Practices
Electronic Front Running
So-called “electronic front running” involves an HFT learning of a transaction that has occurred at one exchange and
adjusting its quotes at other trading venues. The most obvious
reason for doing this is that the HFT has inferred that orders
similar to the one that executed may still be in transit heading
towards other exchanges; and the HFT, for reasons that will
be discussed, may want to avoid transacting with those orders.
All of the criticisms of HFT electronic front running
focus on the fact that the HFT can be expected to be better
off and some other trader involved worse off. It should be
noted at the outset, however, that the HFT practice labeled
as “electronic front running” is distinctly different from the
kind of behavior that has traditionally been termed “front
running.” Traditional front running, which is clearly illegal,
refers to the practice of a broker—who bears a legal duty to its
clients not to use their orders to its own advantage—trading
ahead of said orders to realize a gain. In contrast, when an
HFT engages in “electronic front running,” it has no preexisting relationship with the trader akin to what a broker is
obligated vis-a-vis its customer. And the practice thus involves
no breach of duty or mutually agreed upon terms between
contracting parties, nor does it involve any breach by HFTs
of the federal anti-fraud laws. (A better term for the practice
might be “inter-venue order cancellation,” but we will stick
with the popular term here.)
Our analysis of electronic front-running is somewhat
involved, so a few summary points are in order. Basically,
permitting electronic front-running enables liquidity providers to more easily adjust their quotes at trading venues in
response to information about quotes and transactions that
they receive at any given venue. Essentially, such adjustments make it more difficult for traders who want to transact
rapidly in large size before liquidity providers can do exactly
that—adjust their quotes. Investors who wish to purchase or
sell only a small volume of stock will be indifferent to order
cancellation since they can simply transact at the top of the
book at one venue. Also largely unaffected by the adjustments
of liquidity providers are those investors who wish to transact in significant volume, but have a considerable period of
time to do so, and so can simply send in small orders over an
extended period of time.
Thus, the distributional and efficiency consequences of
electronic front-running turn on precisely who is interested in
transacting rapidly in large size and with whom they so trans-

19. In an efficient market, the market price, whether it is relatively accurate or inaccurate, is an unbiased predictor of an issuer’s future cash flows. If it is inaccurate, it is
just more likely to be far off, one way or the other, from how things ultimately turn out.
Thus an efficient, but relatively inaccurate, price would result in as many positive surprises as negative ones. To many investors, the negative surprise is likely to be more
memorable. So when a negative surprise materializes, it generates a sense of grievance
even though, ex ante, a positive surprise was equally likely.

20. The cost of capital is lower because the prospect of a smaller bid/ask spread results in the same issuer’s expected future cash flow being discounted to present value at
a lower discount rate. See Yakov Amihud and Haim Mendelson, “Asset Pricing and the
Bid-Ask Spread,” 17 Journal of Financial Economics (1986).
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act. Because trade data is anonymous, our analysis must rely
on a stylized characterization of market participants based on
the available empirical data and the implications of trading
needs.
A. Wealth transfer considerations. To see the distributive
effects of electronic front running, we will begin by assuming
that there are only three kinds of market participants: HFTs,
informed traders who trade on the basis of fundamental value
information, and uninformed traders.
Why might Lightning wish to cancel its sell limit order on
NYSE? One possibility is that given its inference that a large
market buy order is likely soon to arrive at NYSE, Lightning
wishes to submit, in place of its cancelled order, a new sell
limit order for the same number of shares at a higher price—
say, $48.02. If Lightning does so and Smartmoney’s buy order
executes against this new higher quote, the HFT will be better
off, and Smartmoney worse off, by $.02 per share.
Note, though, that the HFT will be able to improve its
position in this way only if there is room in the NYSE limit
order book so that the $48.02 offer price is still more attractive to potential buyers than any other offers with respect to
what Amgen already posted on NYSE. Suppose, for example,
that prior to Lightning’s cancellation, the next best offer on
the NYSE was 15,000 shares at $48.01 and the best offer after
that was 20,000 shares at $48.02. The price and time priority rules would mean that Smartmoney’s buy order would
execute against these other two standing offers, not against
any new $42.02 offer by Lightning.
This cautionary note, though, hides a more critical point:
Lightning may wish to cancel its $48.00 sell limit order
even if in fact there is no room in the book to improve its
position by selling to Smartmoney at a higher price. Recall
that to survive in a competitive market, a market maker like
Lightning must set its quotes aggressively enough to attract
business, but not so aggressively that the profit it makes when
buying from, and selling to, uninformed traders is less than
what it loses by engaging in such transactions with informed
traders. $48.00 was what Lightning calculated at the time
it posted its sell limit order to be the optimal price for an
offer of 35,000 shares, based on what it knew then about the
likelihood of the existence of positive private information.
Now, however, Lightning knows something more: a large buy
order has transacted on BATS Y. This will cause Lightning
to revise upward its assessment of the likelihood that private
information suggests that the value of a security is higher than
the market previously thought. The upward revision is very
possibly large enough that $48.00 is no longer the optimal
price at which to offer to sell shares. In that case, Lightning

will be better off cancelling its $48.00 limit offer on NYSE.
As this example suggests, the fundamental distributional
effect of permitting electronic front-running is thus to enable
liquidity providers to reduce their losses to informed traders
who are attempting to trade rapidly in large size.
Further, the ability of liquidity providers to reduce losses
to the informed has two significant consequences:
1. Electronic front running narrows spreads. The availability of electronic front running by HFTs allows HFTs
to better detect the possibility that informed market orders
are headed for their limit orders. If HFTs did not have the
ability to learn these things and alter their standing limit
orders accordingly, they would know that a larger percentage of the trades that will execute against their limit orders
will come from informed traders. And the primary cost of
being a liquidity supplier—the losses incurred from dealing
with informed traders—would therefore go up. Accordingly,
HFTs would widen their initially posted bid/ask spreads to
compensate.
2. Electronic front running helps uninformed investors
and hurts informed investors. If electronic front running were
eliminated, uninformed traders and informed traders would
both suffer from the resulting larger spreads—the higher
offers and lower bids—because it will be more expensive
for both to trade. For uninformed traders, that is the end
of the story. Informed traders, however, would get a morethan-compensating benefit. To see why, note that because
eliminating electronic front running would make it more
difficult for liquidity providers to detect informed traders,
HFTs would increase their spreads sufficiently to cover the
expected trading losses against informed traders, but not
so much as to undermine their competitive position.21 And
because the increased spreads will be borne by all traders,
informed and uninformed alike, the higher spreads paid
by the uninformed traders will effectively “subsidize” the
informed traders who would otherwise have incurred even
larger spreads.22 And this means that informed traders come
out ahead; the gains they would have enjoyed without the
increase in spreads are not fully dissipated by the extra they
must pay because the spreads in fact are increased. The rest
of what HFTs need to break even comes from uninformed
traders, who must pay the increased spread too.
In sum, electronic front running benefits uninformed
investors and harms informed ones who seek to trade rapidly
in large size.
B. The ultimate incidence of electronic front running.
Electronic front running has been regularly attacked as
harming “ordinary investors.”23 Our analysis, however,

21. This statement assumes that the increase in spreads would not decrease the
volume of trading but, in fact, an increase in spreads makes trading more costly, suggesting that the volume would be lower with the increase in spreads than without it.
22. Reg. NMS precludes exchanges from restricting access to trading on their facilities. See Regulation National Market System Rule 610(a), 17 C.F.R. § 242.610(a)
(2005) (prohibiting “national securities exchange[s] [from] . . . prevent[ing] or inhibit[ing]

any person from obtaining efficient access” to trading against the buy and sell quotes
posted on exchanges); Securities and Exchange Act Section 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1934)
(providing that “the rules of [a registered] exchange [must] provide that any registered
broker or dealer . . . may become a member of such exchange”).
23. See, e.g., Lewis, Flash Boys, at 104;
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suggests that this is mistaken. Retail investors generally lack
any significant private information and are assumed to be
uninformed. Small uninformed investors are helped, not
hurt, by electronic front running.
Most of the persons whose money is invested in indexbased mutual funds and pension funds would also presumably
count as ordinary investors. These entities too, by definition,
are uninformed traders. The purchases and sales of such funds
are not prompted by any kind of private information; they
simply buy all the stocks in the index when they receive a net
inflow of investor funds and sell all stocks in the index when
the volume of investor redemptions is sufficient to result in
a net outflow of funds. Again, electronic front running, by
narrowing spreads and reducing the cost of trading, generally
helps, not hurts, these funds and their ordinary investors.
However, insofar as index funds sometimes find themselves
needing to trade rapidly in large size, they too will suffer from
the availability of electronic front-running.
Critics have pointed out that the beneficiaries of electronic
front running are the exchanges and the HFTs themselves24 —
and here they are closer to the mark. An exchange charges
HFTs fees for permitting co-location: namely, the right to
place the HFT’s server very near the exchange’s matching
engine. If electronic front running were eliminated tomorrow,
HFT co-location facilities would be worth less to the HFTs
and this may reduce the rents collected by the exchanges. Any
such reduction in rents certainly would hurt the exchanges, at
least in the short run.25 In the much longer run, the revenues
of firms in a competitive industry can be expected to just
equal their costs, including an ordinary market return on
capital. Thus, any revenues lost from co-location fees would
need to be made up through higher charges to investors who
trade on the exchange.
C. Efficiency considerations. Recall that the fundamental
effect of electronic front-running is to make it harder to trade
rapidly in large size without liquidity providers adjusting their
quotes. Assessing the efficiency consequences of this means
understanding how the relevant participants are affected.
Elimination of electronic front running would have three
effects in terms of the efficient operation of the economy, two
of which would appear to be efficiency-increasing and one
efficiency-reducing.
• Improved share price accuracy. Elimination of
electronic front running would make it more profitable for
informed traders to generate new private information and so
they will do more of it, thereby making prices more accurate.
• Reduced resources going to HFT activities. Eliminat-

ing electronic front running would reduce the productive
resources currently devoted to it, including highly sophisticated technical personnel, advanced computers, and fiber
optic networks. 26
• Allocation of resources over time and allocation of
risk. By widening spreads, elimination of electronic front
running would make the equities market less liquid. This
has an unambiguously negative effect, both on share prices
and capital allocation, and on the efficient allocation of risk
throughout the economy.
D. Taking other kinds of informed traders into account.
As mentioned, in addition to fundamental value information, two other types of private information can give a trader
a significant advantage: announcement information and
inside information. These additional kinds of private information do not change the conclusions above that electronic
front running has positive effects on uninformed investors or
that electronic front running consumes real resources. But,
taking account of these additional kinds of private information may well change the conclusion above about the impact
of electronic front running on fundamental value information
traders and hence the impact on price accuracy.
One might conclude that eliminating electronic front
running would help traders with announcement information
and inside information more than traders with fundamental
value information. If HFTs need to increase spreads sufficiently to cover their increased trading losses, fundamental
value information traders would have to pay as much extra per
trade as traders on the other two kinds of private information,
but would get only a small portion of the additional trading
gains. It is thus quite possible that fundamental value information traders will gain less than they pay in increased spread
and thus will be hurt by the elimination of the practice.
This is because fundamental value traders are less susceptible to detection by electronic front runners than the other
two kinds of private information traders. Announcement
information traders need to do all of their trading quickly
and therefore need to do larger transactions, which are easier
for HFTs to detect and react to. Fundamental value traders,
by contrast, often spread their planned purchases or sales over
several days or weeks, and so break the total amount they
wish to transact into small packets that look more like the
trades of uninformed traders. Admittedly, we would need to
know much more to make this characterization definitively,
but the longer the time period before other market participants get wind of the information possessed by an informed
trader, the less that trader’s incentive to trade in substantial

24. See, e.g., Lewis, Flash Boys, at 126, 176.
25. However, the impact of eliminating any of these practices is uncertain because
HFTs desire co-location for a number of reasons. See Charles M. Jones, What Do We
Know about High-Frequency Trading, Columbia Business School Research Paper No.
33-36, at 10, 26 (2013) (discussing that HFTs seek co-location to minimize their latency in learning of quote changes and in altering their quotes and analyzing empirical
evidence that the introduction of co-location improves liquidity).

26. While high-frequency traders are notoriously secretive, HFT Virtu Financial, Inc.
(“Virtu”) did make certain public disclosures in the run up to its now postponed IPO. In
2013 alone, Virtu reported spending approximately $65 million on communication and
data processing and $78 million on employee compensation and payroll taxes. Since
Virtu has only 151 employees, this means they pay an average salary of about
$517,000. Virtu is just one of several large HFTs and there are many smaller ones as
well. See Form S-1 of Virtu Financial, Inc., https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/1592386/0001047469140-02070/a2218589zs-1.htm#dm16701_business.
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volume quickly. An announcement trader must trade quickly,
since the signal that makes them informed has just become
public. Not so with the fundamental value informed trader.
In fact, further research may well suggest that electronic
front running actually helps, not hurts, fundamental value
information trading. And to the extent this is so, we would
have to modify our earlier conclusion that electronic front
running would reduce share price accuracy.
Slow Market Arbitrage
Slow market arbitrage can occur when an HFT has posted a
quote representing the NBO or NBB on one exchange, and
subsequently someone else posts an even better quote on a
second exchange, which the HFT learns of before it is reported
by the national system. If, in the short time before the national
report updates, a marketable order arrives at the first exchange,
the order will transact against the HFT’s now stale quote. The
HFT, using its speed, can then make a riskless profit by turning around and transacting against the better quote on the
second exchange. (For an illustrative example of slow-market
arbitrage, see Section 1 of the APPENDIX.)
A. Wealth transfer effects. In contrast to electronic front
running, which decreases the effective cost of trading for
uninformed traders but increases it for informed traders, slow
market arbitrage increases the effective cost of trading for all
regular traders, informed and uninformed.
B. Efficiency considerations. Although arbitrage usually
has positive economic welfare effects, slow market arbitrage
has little in common with ordinary arbitrage. Slow market
arbitrage adds a third party, the liquidity supplier, whose only
social purpose is to facilitate trades between regular traders, but
who are the only gainers from the so-called arbitrage. Regular
traders, both informed and uninformed, are losers because their
cost of trading goes up. So the normal presumption in favor
of activities carrying the label “arbitrage” does not apply here.
Even if slow market arbitrage consumed no real resources,
it would have an unambiguously negative impact on welfare.
By raising the effective cost of trading for informed traders,
slow market arbitrage makes it less rewarding for fundamental investors to seek out publicly available information
and analyze their implications in a sophisticated way. This
reduces share price accuracy, with all the negative effects
already described.
HFT Exploitation of Mid-Point Orders
A trader will often submit to a dark pool a “mid-point”
limit buy or sell order, the terms of which require that it be
executed against the next marketable order with the opposite
interest to arrive at the pool and at a price equal to the mid27. See, e.g., Alex Paley, Navigating the Dark Pool Landscape, Deutsche Bank 46
(2010) https://autobahn.db.com/microSite/docs/Navigating_Dark_Pool_Landscape.pdf.
This point that was also noted in Flash Boys, p. 113-118.
28. Lewis, Flash Boys at 112.
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point between the best publicly reported bid and offer at the
time of execution. Mid-point orders appear to have the advantage of enabling uninformed investors to buy at well below
the best offer and to sell well above the best bid.
It has been noted for a number of years, however, that the
traders who post such orders are vulnerable to the activities
of HFTs.27 Mid-point order exploitation again involves an
HFT detecting an improvement in the best available bid or
offer on one of the exchanges before the new quote is publicly
reported. The HFT puts in an order to transact against the
new improved quote, and then sends an order reversing the
transaction to a dark pool that contains mid-point limit
orders with the opposite interest that transact at a price equal
to the mid-point between the now stale best publicly reported
bid and offer. (For an illustrative example of such mid pointorder exploitation, see Section 2 of the APPENDIX.)
A. Wealth transfer and efficiency considerations. HFT
exploitation of dark pool mid-point orders clearly provides
rents to HFTs. There is no social benefit from this activity
since it is unrelated to the main positive function that we have
attributed to HFTs—namely, providing liquidity in a world
with both uninformed and informed traders. Since trading
is a zero-sum game, if the HFTs gain, certain regular traders
must lose.
The economic function of dark pools is to provide a place
for uninformed traders to lower their costs by trading with
other uninformed traders. By undermining the ability of such
traders to do this, mid-point exploitation by HFTs hurts not
only those who use dark pools but also those who would
have used them but for this higher cost. This will reduce the
efficiency of both the allocation of resources over time and
the allocation of risk in the economy.
Nevertheless, to the extent that the practice steers more
uninformed traders to the exchanges, it leads to a narrowing
of spreads on the exchanges, thereby reducing the cost of
fundamental value information trading and thus improving
share price accuracy.
High-Frequency Trading and Volatility
When making his case that HFT activity causes greater
volatility in equity markets, Michael Lewis asserts that the
intra-day price volatility of the stock market was 40% greater
between 2010 and 2013 than it was between 2004 and 2006,
and associates this change with the enactment of Reg. NMS
and the rise of HFTs.28 But there is a major problem with this
comparison: the years 2004-2006 were ones of uncharacteristically low volatility, below that of any other two-year period
from 1998 to 2012.29 And the years 2010-2013 are also unrepresentative in the sense that they came in the wake of the most
29. Bank for International Settlements Papers No. 29, The Recent Behaviour of Financial Market Volatility 1 (2006).

Fall 2017

severe financial crisis since the Great Depression and thus
significantly increased uncertainty about the fundamental
values of securities.30 A more useful and revealing comparison
would have shown that market volatility during the period
2012 to the present, even with the expanded HFT activity,
was considerably lower than the volatility experienced during
the comparably long (and more representative) period of the
1990s and early 2000s.
In sum, there is little serious evidence of a causal link
between HFTs and ongoing increased volatility: HFTs, as
just noted, rose to prominence during a period of greater
volatility that was attributable to economic causes that had
little to do with the HFTs themselves. And there is also no
theoretical reason for expecting HFT activity to increase
general, ongoing volatility. Indeed, the majority of academic
evidence on the subject suggests that the activity of HFTs
reduces such volatility.31
A. The Flash Crash. More interesting and plausible is the
claim that HFTs exacerbate volatility during market disruptions, such as the infamous May 6, 2010 “Flash Crash.” The
Flash Crash occurred during a period of less than 30 minutes
in which the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped about
1,000 points (representing 9% of its value) and then recovered
almost its entire loss. This was the DJIA’s greatest one-hour
decline in history and several individual stocks displayed
astonishing volatility. 32 Accenture, for instance, fell from
$39.98 at 2:46 p.m. to one cent at 2:49 p.m., only to return
to $39.51 by 2:50 p.m.
The Flash Crash was widely taken to “highlight the risks
of electronic trading,” as suggested in a report by NYSE’s then
head of operations.33 And in the years since, other commentators have also blamed HFTs for the severity of market
crashes.34 However, the report eventually issued by federal
regulators explained the Flash Crash not as the result of HFT
predation, but as the result of a liquidity crisis caused by a
series of large sell orders that triggered a flight of liquidity
from the market. This flight involved HFTs, but only in the
sense that many HFTs are market makers who left the market

in response to the large sell orders. This temporary disappearance of the HFTs removed substantial liquidity.35
The crucial question is: Why would a large market sell
order trigger a flight by HFTs, when the business of HFTs is
to provide liquidity to persons submitting marketable orders?
The short answer is that, as we have seen, adverse selection
shapes the provision of liquidity.36 The Flash Crash is directly
connected to adverse selection. A large, aggressive sell (or buy)
order suggests to liquidity providers that the order submitters
may have important private information. If that is correct,
then HFTs will lose money from trading that order and so
they will widen their spreads. If the adverse selection threat
becomes extreme enough, many or all liquidity providers will
temporarily exit from the market altogether and prices will
fluctuate widely.37 This happened on a large scale during the
Flash Crash.
In sum, the behavior of HFTs during the Flash Crash was
not predatory; it was simply self-preserving and unheroic.38
Moreover, the history of human market makers’ responses to
crises is largely consistent with this episode.
B. Wealth transfer considerations. The wealth transfers
resulting from gyrations such as the Flash Crash are the same
as those that occur at other times when HFTs stop providing liquidity. The losers are the traders who put in market
sell orders for stocks that temporarily went way down and
market buy orders for stocks that temporarily went way up.
The winners were those who posted previously way-out-ofthe-money limit orders against which these market orders
transacted.
C. Efficiency considerations. Events such as the Flash
Crash receive a lot of public attention, but such occasional
brief moments of total collapse of liquidity are not ultimately
very important in terms of the performance and efficiency of
the overall economy—though, if large and frequent enough,
they could have important effects on investors’ confidence in
the market. But barring that possibility, such sharp but very
brief deviations of share prices from fundamental values do
not seriously undermine capital allocation; it is accuracy most

30. See Angel et al., supra note 15, at 11-12; see also John Y. Campbell, Martin
Lettau, Burton G. Malkiel & Yexiao Xu, Have Individual Stocks Become More Volatile?
An Empirical Exploration of Idiosyncratic Risk, 56 J. Fin. 1 (2001) (finding significant
spikes in volatility during periods of major economic crisis).
31. See, e.g., Joel Hasbrouck & Gideon Saar, Low-Latency Trading, 16 J. Fin. Markets 646 (2013), which finds that HFT activity reduces volatility. See also Jonathan
Brogaard, Thibaut Moyaert & Ryan Riordan, High-Frequency Trading and Market Stability, Working Paper (May 2014).
32. See Tom Lauricella & Peter A. McKay, Dow Takes a Harrowing 1,010.14-Point
Trip, Wall S.J., May 7, 2010 and Tom Lauricella & Scott Patterson, Legacy of the ‘Flash
Crash’: Enduring Worries of Repeat, WALL S.J., Aug. 6, 2010, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704545004575353-443450790402. Many of the most
outlandish transactions executed during the Flash Crash were later cancelled or “broken”
by regulators. See Deborah L. Jacobs, Why We Could Easily Have Another Flash Crash,
FORBES, Aug. 9, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/-sites/deborahljacobs/2013/08/09/
why-we-could-easily-have-another-flash-crash/.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Andrew Smith, Fast Money: The Battle Against the High Frequency
Traders, Guardian, June 7, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jun/07/
inside-murky-world-high-frequency-trading; Michael Ono, High Frequency Trading May

Magnify Market Woes, ABC News, Aug. 11, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/
high-frequency-trading-accelerating-market-woes/story?id=14280847 (suggesting that
“computer-driven high frequency trading is partially responsible for accelerating stock
gyrations”).
35. Flash Crash Report at 6.
36. This article focuses on HFTs as liquidity providers, and there is ample evidence
they play this role. See, e.g., Albert J. Menkveld, High-Frequency Trading and the NewMarket Makers, 16 J. Fin. Markets 712 (2013).
37. Flash Crash Report at 2-3.
38. David Easley, Marcos López de Prado & Maureen O’Hara, The Microstructure of
the ‘Flash Crash’: Flow Toxicity, Liquidity Crashes and the Probability of Informed Trading, 37 J. Portfolio Mgmt. 118, 120-26 (2011) (suggesting that order flow was especially informed and hence toxic for market makers in the period preceding the Flash
Crash). Perceiving the large sell order to have a higher probability of being motivated by
private information, given its size and aggressiveness, HFTs removed their quotes to
minimize their trading losses, and liquidated the long positions they had accumulated,
exacerbating pressures on price declines; 31 of Flash Crash Report at 29. Because HFTs
provide a large share of liquidity, in their absence, the only quotes left lay far from the
true price of a security. See Flash Crash Report at 45-57.
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of the time that matters. The modern stock market’s overall
performance in terms of liquidity provision and operational
costs is far better than the market of the past.
Dark Pools and the Fate of Customer Orders
Large investment banks, which are both important brokers
and operators of dark pools,39 have been accused of directing their brokerage orders to their own dark pools even when
the orders will receive inferior execution there.40 Dark pool
operators are also alleged to misrepresent the nature of other
parties’ trading in their pools in order to induce brokerage
customers to use the pools. Customers have difficulty detecting such practices; and even when they do, they are allegedly
reluctant to switch brokers because they depend on “soft
money” services from the banks.41
We do not know whether any of these practices is
widespread,42 though it’s worth noting that the SEC has
brought a number of successful proceedings against dark pool
operators.43 These practices are clearly illegal, and their wealth
transfer and efficiency effects appear completely negative. If
evidence emerges that they are in fact widespread, we would
suggest policy reforms designed to make enforcement of the
current laws more effective.
A. Understanding the function of dark pools. A dark
pool, like an exchange, is typically an electronic limit order
book; but unlike an exchange, it does not publicly reveal the
limit orders that are posted on it. Dark pool operators restrict
who can post limit orders and submit marketable orders.44
Despite their nefarious-sounding moniker, dark pools can
provide useful, legitimate services to their customers. Such
pools were initially created with the aim of limiting adverse
selection costs by providing a venue where uninformed buyers
and sellers could trade substantial amounts of stock at prices
potentially much better than the NBO and NBB.45 The
mid-point is a substantially better price for the buyer than
the NBO, and it is the same for the seller relative to the NBB.
39. An underlying premise of these criticisms is that the largest investment banks are
also among the most prominent brokers and dark pool operators. For instance, Lewis
often discusses dark pools as being operated by Wall Street banks, which is accurate—
six of the ten largest dark pools are run by major investment banks, see Rhodi Preece,
Dark Pools, Internalization, and Equity Market Quality, CFA Institute Codes, Standards,
and Position Papers 14-15 (2012). All of the ten largest brokers on NYSE are also
global investment banks. See NYSE Market Data, NYSE Broker Volume, http://www.
nyxdata.com/ (last checked Jan. 16, 2015).
40. Michael Lewis, for example, claims that dark pool operators sell access to their
trading venues to HFTs—without disclosing this practice to other users—and that these
HFTs then exploit other traders. Lewis, Flash Boys at 123. Inferior execution could also
occur on a dark pool if the counterparties trading there are especially informed or were
given information about the existence of the customer limit orders posted there.
41. Id. at 102-03, 214-15.
42. Most recently, New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman filed a civil suit
against Barclays alleging that Barclays’ dark pool, Barclays LX (then the second largest
in the U.S.) misrepresented to users the involvement of HFTs in LX, the informational
advantages given to HFTs, and that Barclays, as a broker, claimed that it treated all
venues the same based on quality, while it actually disproportionately routed client orders to its own pool. See Complaint, Schneiderman v. Barclays, No. 451391/2014
(N.Y. Sup. 2014), at ¶¶ 1-2.
43. See, e.g., In the Matter of Pipeline Trading Systems LLC, SEC Release No. 339271; In the Matter of Liquidnet Inc., SEC Release No. 33-9596.
44. See Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading System Rule 301(b)(5), 17
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The ideal dark pool would be one where the parties
posting limit mid-point orders and sending in marketable
orders are completely uninformed. The system begins to break
down when dark pool traders are informed. Since informed
traders will transact against limit orders in the dark pool only
when the mid-point price looks advantageous to them, such
trades are likely to be disadvantageous to the person posting
the limit offer. Thus, the dark pool operator provides a service
if it can effectively monitor the parties posting the mid-point
limit orders and the parties sending in marketable orders to
ensure that both sides are relatively unlikely to be informed.46
B. Wealth transfer and efficiency considerations. An
order sent to a less than ideal dark pool may execute at less
desirable terms than at another venue. If an investment bank
sends a trader’s order to its own dark pool knowing that the
order would receive superior execution elsewhere, the bank
gains and the customer loses.47 The same result is likely if the
bank ignores customer instructions or if it misrepresents the
nature of the parties allowed to trade on the bank’s dark pool
to create the impression that there is less danger of informed
counterparties than there really is. All of these effects make
investment banks richer and traders poorer. What’s more,
brokers have a legal duty of best execution in routing their
customers’ orders, one that should be enforced as vigorously,
but also as cost effectively, as possible.48 Moreover, such
practices are inefficient for the simple reason that fraud,
misrepresentation, and failure to carry out customer orders
as directed all end up undermining the voluntary nature of
transactions, and thus the underlying premise that trade is
mutually beneficial and so welfare enhancing.
Recommendations
Potential regulatory responses to these five practices can be
seen as falling into three groups: (1) proposals designed to
limit the negative effects of front-running and other practices
associated with HFTs’ speed and informational advantages;
C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(5) (1997); Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 34-61358, 17 C.F.R. § 242, at 72 (“As [trading systems] that
are exempt from exchange registration, [off-exchange platforms] are not required to provide fair access [to all traders] unless they reach a 5% trading volume threshold in a
stock, which none currently do[es]” and that “[a]s a result, access to . . . [these platforms] . . . is determined primarily by private negotiation.”).
45. See, e.g., Rhodi Preece, Dark Pools, Internalization, and Equity Market Quality,
CFA Institute Codes, Standards, and Position Papers 12-13 (2012).
46. The operator provides a similar service to the extent that it keeps out HFTs that
engage in mid-point order exploitation.
47. A broker can make money off transactions occurring on its dark pool for several
additional reasons. If it is executing marketable orders on its dark pool, then a broker will
receive its commission without having to subtract the “taker” fee charged marketable
orders on most exchanges. If the broker is internalizing orders on its own dark pool and
transacting against them as principal, then it can make half the spread on each trade.
And then there are the more nefarious inducements suggested by the criticisms, such as
exploitation of orders by a broker’s HFT affiliate that has improperly been given details
about orders.
48. This requires the broker to exercise “reasonable diligence to ascertain the best
market” for a transaction to ensure an order receives a price “as favorable as possible
under prevailing market conditions.” In essence, the duty of best execution is a default
term in the contract between the broker and its customer. Its violation leads to the same
efficiency concerns that any other breach would: the fact that the parties voluntarily entered into the transaction no longer leads to the presumption that it can be expected to
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(2) proposals intended to limit the effects of HFTs on stock
market volatility; and (3) proposals intended to limit abuses
by dark pools.
Proposals to Regulate HFT Speed in
Obtaining Market Information
Such proposals are designed to limit any negative effects of
three of the controversial practices we have focused on: electronic front running, slow market arbitrage, and exploitation
of dark pool mid-point orders.
1. Would it be desirable to eliminate electronic front
running? The unfairness case against electronic front running
is weak. And it is unclear whether the informational advantages that HFTs obtain from electronic front running call for
regulatory intervention on efficiency grounds. Based on what
we know at the moment, the matter may be too close to call.
a. Actual unfairness. Electronic front running actually
appears to benefit ordinary retail investors, including those
who own mutual fund investments or pension funds that
invest in indices and trade on exchanges. Retail investors
are largely uninformed, and index investing is by definition
uninformed.49 The elimination of electronic front running
would likely reduce liquidity for such investors, making
uninformed trading more expensive without any gains for
the uninformed traders from the increased anonymity.
b. Efficiency. Elimination of electronic front running
could arguably produce efficiency gains from better capital
allocation arising from increases in price accuracy. But such
gains, as just noted, would come at the expense of reduced
liquidity, leading to less efficient capital and risk allocation.
And on balance, it is not clear that elimination would increase
efficiency. Our more nuanced analysis, which considers the
roles in price discovery played by announcement information
traders, suggests that eliminating electronic front running
would reduce, not improve, price accuracy. In terms of its
effects on various kinds of informed traders, electronic frontrunning makes it more difficult for announcement traders
to be profitable, but does not affect the profitability of
fundamental value trading. Because announcement trading
harms liquidity but is of little benefit from a price accuracy
perspective—since real economy decision making obviously
occurs on a much longer time scale than mere milliseconds—
electronic front-running probably improves price accuracy.
c. Appearance of unfairness. While our analysis suggests
that electronic front running does not actually result in
unfairness, a substantial portion of the public still views HFT

practices as unfair. Under normal circumstances, the best
response to misunderstanding is education, not prohibition
of an activity that does not in fact pose a problem. Still, an
unfounded but persistent sense of unfairness is demoralizing:
it simply makes people feel bad to think that a major social
institution is corrupt. It also discourages direct and indirect
ownership of equities by persons who, without this sense that
something unfair was going on, would find equities to be a
suitable investment vehicle. More empirical study of market
confidence could make a valuable important contribution to
more effective securities policymaking. If the perception of
information asymmetries prevents a substantial amount of
retail participation in equities, regulation designed to maintain
or increase such confidence may indeed be worthwhile.
2. What happens to the case for eliminating electronic
front running when slow market arbitrage and exploitation of
dark pool mid-point orders are added to the analysis? These
two practices both seem unquestionably undesirable. Slow
market arbitrage hurts all regular traders, uninformed and
informed alike, by increasing their effective cost of trading. Its
economic welfare effects are unambiguously negative as well.
The exploitation of dark pool mid-point orders by HFTs hurts
uninformed investors and misallocates resources and risk.
And even if it may be good social policy to push uninformed
traders out of dark pools and onto exchanges, there are more
direct ways of doing it than allowing HFTs to profit in this
particular fashion.
3. What does this imply about current proposals to
regulate HFTs? When evaluating measures to prevent
electronic front running and other speed-based practices,
we lean toward reforms that would reduce HFTs’ informational advantages, provided it can be done at relatively low
cost and would reduce or eliminate slow market arbitrage
and mid-point order exploitation while not interfering with
electronic front-running.
Consider two regulatory proposals that aim to curb
high frequency quoting activity.50 The first provides financial disincentives for high-volume quoting, such as NYSE
Euronext’s recent surcharge on each order above a 100:1
order-to-trade ratio. If mandated by regulation, such fees
would widen spreads and reduce depth by making it harder
for market makers to control adverse selection and inventory
risks through their quoting strategies.
A second proposal would impose a minimum time-inforce for quotes, prohibiting them from being canceled,
within, for example, 100 milliseconds of submission. But

advance the interests of both and that it is thus efficiency enhancing. This duty exists
both as a matter of state common law of agency and under the rules of the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”).
49. It should be noted that a significant portion of retail marketable orders and indexbased institutional orders execute off exchanges and in venues where the trades can be
identified as largely uninformed. See SEC Release No. 34-68937; File No. SR-NASDAQ-2012-129, February 15, PG. 17 (2013; Rhodi Preece, Dark Pools, Internalization, and Equity Market Quality, CFA Institute Codes, Standards, and Position Papers 3
(2012) (“Internalization is also thought to account for almost 100% of all retail market-

able order flow.”). In a fully competitive market, the spreads associated with these trades
should not include a significant adverse selection component. Thus, they should be unaffected by whether or not electronic front running occurs on the exchanges, where, in the
absence of the practice, the spreads would be wider to reflect the greater risk that the
HFTs are subjected to in dealing with informed traders. In reality, however, the spreads
are barely smaller in these off exchange executions (i.e., there is only a small amount of
“price improvement”). As analyzed below, why this is the case will affect the conclusion
of whether wider spreads on the exchange in fact are passed on to the retail customer.
50. See Jones, supra note 31, at 42-51.
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the costs of such a regulation in terms of liquidity could be
substantial. It sets a floor on the length of the option offered
by liquidity providers to liquidity takers, which increases
their chance of being “picked off” by informed traders and
so would tend to widen spreads as liquidity providers increase
the cost of liquidity in response.
Another much-discussed proposal calls for replacing the
current market trading structure that features continuous
two-sided (i.e. buy and sell) auctions for each security with
frequent batch auctions, say, every 100 milliseconds.51 Batch
auctions would consist of uniform-price, sealed-bid auctions
conducted at discrete time intervals. But if frequent batch
auctions have the potential to eliminate the value of minute
speed advantages, their effectiveness in so doing would
depend on how they are implemented. To eliminate such
advantages, every exchange would have to hold its auction
simultaneously. If auctions were sufficiently frequent and
held at different times at each exchange, then intra-exchange
exploitation of tiny speed differences could persist, including electronic front-running. We consider this an intriguing
proposal, but it would be difficult to implement on a systemwide basis.
We think there is an approach to ending HFT information
speed advantages that is simpler both in terms of implementation and of achieving the needed legal changes. None of these
three practices would be possible if private data feeds did not
make top-of-the-book quote and transaction data effectively
available to some market participants before others. Thus,
one potential regulatory response to the problem posed by
HFT activity is to require that private dissemination of quote
and trade information be delayed until the exclusive processor under the Reg. NMS scheme, referred to as the “SIP,” has
publicly disseminated information from all exchanges.
Rule 603(a) of Reg. NMS already prohibits exchanges
from “unreasonably discriminatory” distribution of market
data.52 The SEC has interpreted this to mean that privately
“distributed data could not be made available on a more
timely basis [to private clients] than core data is made
available to a Network processor [the SIP]… Rule 603(a)
prohibits an SRO or broker-dealer from transmitting data
to a vendor or user any sooner than it transmits the data to a
Network processor.”53 This interpretation of the “unreasonably discriminatory” distribution language appears to permit
core data information to reach HFTs more rapidly than the
public recipients of the SIP as long as the signal to the HFT
and the signal from the SIP went out at the same time. And
the SEC, in its choice of enforcement actions, has confirmed

this interpretation as well. 54 Nonetheless, the language of
603(a) is plausibly open to requiring that best quote and
transaction data arrive at the same time for all traders. Such
a regulation, if effectively enforced, would have the effect
of limiting, though not completely eliminating, the informational advantage of HFTs. And by so doing, some of the
liquidity benefits of electronic front running for uninformed
traders would be preserved, while significantly reducing the
ability of HFTs to conduct their slow market arbitrage and
dark pool activities.

51. For example, Budish et al.’s proposal, which was endorsed by New York’s Attorney General Eric Schneiderman. See Eric B. Budish, Peter Cramton, & John J. Shim, The
High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response, Fama-Miller Working Paper; Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 14-03 (December 23, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2388265.
52. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.603(a)(2). Section 11A(c)(1) of the Exchange Act authorizes the Commission to regulate market data.

53. See Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,567 & 37,569 (June 29, 2005)
(adopting release), http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-51808fr.pdf.
54. In a 2012 proceeding, the SEC found that NYSE had been sending market data,
including best bids and offers, to private subscribers before it sent that data to the SIP,
and fined NYSE $5 million. See In the Matter of New York Stock Exchange LLC, and
NYSE Euronext, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 67857, 2012 WL 4044880
(2012), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2012/34-67857.pdf.
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HFTs and Volatility
Overall, there is little evidence that HFT activities increase
market volatility on an ongoing basis. The connection
between HFTs and episodic volatility is not attributable to
predatory behavior by HFTs, but rather to their rational withdrawal from the market at certain moments of stress.
There are nonetheless a number of existing proposals that
address the alleged link between HFT activity and volatility. These proposals fall into two groups: one seeks to limit
trading volatility generally and would incidentally affect
HFTs; the second seeks to target a specific link between HFTs
and volatility.
The first group includes SEC-governed single-stock
circuit breakers, which impose a five-minute trading halt if
the price of a specific stock moves by more than 10% within
five minutes. This gives liquidity providers breathing room to
consider whether order imbalances actually reflect information. Similarly, the SEC has also approved a “limit up-limit
down” plan that suspends trading in a stock if transactions
move more than a certain amount, often 5%, away from the
security’s average price over the last five minutes. These are
both moderate proposals that should help limit future crashes.
The second set of proposals assumes that market makers
should have stronger liquidity-providing obligations than
they currently do. In the wake of the Flash Crash, exchanges
have already imposed a range of affirmative obligations on
institutionally identified market makers at their venues.
For instance, the NYSE has “designated market makers”
who have specific obligations to help maintain an orderly
and continuous trading market in particular stocks. Some
commentators want HFTs to have legal responsibilities resembling those of the pre-2005 NYSE specialists.
We understand the desire for liquid markets even during
periods of extreme volatility. But any system that requires
liquidity providers to take heavy losses during periods of
extreme adverse selection must compensate them for doing
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so at other times. Determining the value of that compensation is extremely difficult, and these designated liquidity
providers will be the prime targets of informed traders during
crises.55 Thus, we are skeptical about such proposals, especially
because the wealth transfers and efficiency consequences of
episodic volatility are not as substantial as many critics seem
to believe.
Dark Pools
Our analysis suggests that the regulatory focus here should
be on ensuring disclosure of whether customer orders are
being routed to the venues offering best execution and
whether order routing directions are being ignored. FINRA
has recently requested comment on several new proposed
rules promoting greater disclosure. Dark pools should provide
FINRA with more extensive order book information for the
Order Audit Trail System (“OATS”) that helps FINRA carry
out its surveillance activities. Brokers could be required to
disclose what percentage of orders routed to their venue were
executed there, at what price, and what instructions, if any,
were associated with those orders.56
Certainly, more could be done to strengthen the stock
market’s mandatory disclosure regime. Brokers are not
currently required to disclose to customers on their transaction confirmation slips the venue in which an order was
executed,57 even though such records must already be retained
and would provide customers with the ability to check
whether their requests were being followed. To be effective,
these disclosure proposals would have to enable the SEC or
private litigants to reveal inaccurate broker disclosures, and
customers would need to examine and act on those disclosures. If we have reason to worry that they will not, the SEC
should conduct periodic audits to verify the accuracy of these
confirmations.
Conclusion
This article provides a comprehensive framework for understanding a number of controversial players and practices in
the new stock market, including high frequency traders,
electronic front running, and dark pool operators. We argue

55. See Angel et al., supra note 15, at 33.
56. Economist James Angel, among others, has called for greater disclosure by brokers, suggesting that “brokerage firms themselves disclose execution quality directly to
their customers.” Testimony of James J. Angel, The Role of Regulation in Shaping Equity Market Structure and Electronic Trading: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs at 7 (2014).
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that the issues raised by such practices can fundamentally
be understood through just two basic mechanisms—adverse
selection and the principal-agent problem—as they play out
in the context of a multi-venue trading system.
We briefly assess the likely effectiveness of a variety of
potential reforms to current market structure. We agree, for
example, that brokers should be required to disclose more
information about their effectiveness in carrying out the
orders of their customers, particularly those directed to dark
pools. We disagree with proposals that HFTs be required
to keep their quotes in force for some minimum amount of
time, and with proposals aimed at generally discouraging,
or even banning, trading on dark pools. These are bad ideas
that seem to be based on a misunderstanding of how the
market really works or of the actual social impact of a given
practice. In other cases that involve complicated trade-offs,
it may not be obvious whether a reform is desirable, but our
framework allows for a better understanding of the tradeoff
involved, and thus a more informed choice—and it may
have the added benefit of pointing to where further empirical research would be useful. We find this to be the case with
proposals to briefly delay providing HFTs with information
about new transactions and quotation changes, so that HFTs
have no advantages over other traders.
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57. Brokers do have limited disclosure requirements under Reg. NMS. Rule 605 requires trading venues to provide monthly reports with various measures of execution
quality, and Rule 606 requires broker-dealers that route customer orders to provide
quarterly reports that identify at an aggregate level the venues where client orders are
executed. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.605-606.
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APPENDIX
Section 1
Example of slow-market arbitrage
An example.
It is worth noting that the first step in this story—Lowprice’s
posting of the $161.13 offer on EDGE—does not guarantee
that Lightning can make this profit. No marketable buy order
may arrive at NYSE during the reporting gap. Also, even if
one does, by the time Lightning is able to submit its marketable buy order at EDGE, some other person may already have
submitted a buy marketable order to EDGE that picks off the
$161.13 offer. This becomes particularly likely if, as is the case
in the real world, there are a number of HFTs besides Lightning
with co-location facilities at EDGE and at the other exchanges.
Depending on the nature of their own respective offers posted
on various exchanges, one or more of these other HFTs may be
competing with Lightning to pick off the one $161.13 offer.
Who is helped and who is hurt in the example above,
and what are the larger distributive consequences with slow
market arbitrage as an ongoing practice? 58 In the example,
the first thing to note is that Ms. Stumble, the person who,
during the reporting gap, submits the marketable order that
transacts against Lightning’s stale $161.15 offer, is not harmed
by Lightning’s slow market arbitrage activities. Stumble would
have suffered the same fate if Lightning had not engaged in slow
market arbitrage because that course of action would have also
left the $161.15 offer posted on NYSE, and so Stumble’s buy
order would still have transacted against it.
Still, someone must be worse off: Lightning is better off
than if it had not engaged in the slow market arbitrage, and
trading is a zero-sum game. To see who this worse off person
may be, consider first why Lightning is better off. Lightning is
in the business of buying and selling shares, not holding on to
long or short positions for any significant period of time. So it
needs to reverse quickly each transaction it enters. Here, it sold
shares when Stumble’s order transacted against Lightning’s
$161.15 offer on NYSE. To reverse this transaction, Lightning
needed to buy shares. By engaging in slow market arbitrage,
it did so by seizing the best offer in the market—Lowprice’s
$161.13 offer on EDGE—before others in the market even
knew the offer was available. If Lightning had not detected
this new offer ahead of others and seized it, Lightning’s reversal of the situation would occur through posting a bid that
a marketable order transacts against. We know from Part III
that the sale of the shares at $161.15 and their repurchase at
this newly posted bid would each, on an expected basis, be
a break-even transaction. By successfully engaging in slow
market arbitrage, Lightning instead made a certain $.02 profit
per share sold and purchased.
To figure out who is hurt from Lightning engaging in slow
market arbitrage—i.e., detecting the $161.13 offer and seizing

it—consider who would have been better off if Lightning had
posted a new buy limit order instead of seizing Lowprice’s
$161.13 offer. The person or persons helped would come from
one of two groups of potential liquidity takers. One group is
potential sellers who submit marketable sell orders: the posted
bid that Lightning would need filled would improve the terms
for the marginal seller. The other group is potential buyers who
submit marketable buy orders: the opportunity by members of
this group to seize Lowprice’s $161.13 offer, which was better
than anything else available in the market at the time, would
improve terms for the marginal buyer.

58. In the example, if Lightning did not engage in slow market arbitrage, it is possible
that it would be another HFT engaging in slow market arbitrage, not an ordinary trader,

who would transact against the $161.13 offer. The ultimate question we are asking,
however, is what would happen if no HFT engaged in the practice.
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Section 2
Example of HFT Exploitation of Mid-Point Orders
1. An example. Let us bring back again our HFT, Lightning.
Suppose that the NBO and NBB for IBM are $161.15 and
$161.11, respectively, and each are for 1,000 shares and are
posted on NYSE by HFTs other than Lightning. Then the
$161.15 offer is cancelled and a new 1,000 share offer is submitted at $161.12. Lightning, through its co-location facilities at
NYSE, learns of these changes in advance of their being publicly
reported. During the reporting gap, the official NBO remains
$161.15.
Lightning knows that mid-point orders for IBM are often
posted on Opaque, a well-known dark pool, and Lightning
programs its algorithms accordingly. Because Opaque does not
disclose what is in its limit order book, Lightning cannot know,
however, whether at this moment any such orders are posted on
Opaque, and, if there are, whether they are buy orders or sell
orders. Still there is the potential for making money.
Using an ultra-fast connection between the co-location
facility at NYSE and Opaque, a sell limit order for 1,000 shares
at $161.13 is sent to Opaque with the condition attached that
it cancel if it does not transact immediately (a so-called “IOC”
order). This way, if there was one or more mid-point buy limit
orders posted at Opaque for IBM, they will execute against
Lightning’s order at $161.13, half way between the now stale,
but still official, NBB of $161.11 and NBO of $161.15. If there
are no such mid-point buy orders posted at Opaque, nothing
is lost.
Assume that there are one or more such mid-point buy
orders aggregating to at least 1,000 shares and so Lightning’s
sell order of 1,000 shares transacts at $161.13. Lightning’s
co-location facility at NYSE is informed of this fact through
Lightning’s ultra-fast connection with Opaque. A marketable
buy order for 1000 shares is sent almost instantaneously to
NYSE, which transacts against the new $161.12 offer. Thus,
within the short period before the new $161.12 offer on NYSE
is publicly reported, Lightning has been able to execute against
this offer, purchase 1,000 IBM shares at $161.12, and sell them
at $161.13, for what appears to be a $10.00 profit.
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